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Recent Decisions
ZONING -

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING ORDINANCE

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that
a suburban zoning ordinance which limited multi-family dwellings
to a forty-three acre commercial district was unconstitutionally exclusionary, since it did not provide a fair share of the township's
3,800 acres for development of multi-family dwellings.
- FAIR SHARE

-

Surrick v. Zoning HearingBoard, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
In 1972, Robert B. Surrick was the equitable owner of a 12.25 acre
tract of land and the legal owner of an adjacent ten acre tract in
Upper Providence Township, a suburb of Philadelphia.' The property was located in an A-1 Residential zone in which only single
family dwellings on one acre lots were permitted under the township
zoning ordinance. 2 The zoning ordinance restricted multi-family
dwellings or apartments to the forty-three acre B-Business district,
an area that constituted 1.14% of the township's 3,800 acres. 3 This
district was substantially developed, while one fourth of the total
township acreage remained undeveloped.'
Desiring to build garden apartments on the 12.25 acre tract, Surrick applied unsuccessfully to the township Board of Supervisors to
rezone the property to B-Business.5 He then sought a building per1. Surrick acquired the 10 acre tract in 1968, and entered into an agreement to purchase
the 12.25 acre tract immediately adjoining it in June of 1971. The agreement was contingent
upon his ability to secure permission to build apartments on the property. Brief for Appellant
at 3-4, Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant].
2. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1977). The area immediately
surrounding Surrick's property was utilized primarily for single family residences on lots of
one or more acres, with the exception of a gas station one hundred feet to the south, a junior
high school on a 30 acre tract to the north, a 95 acre park to the east, and several churches.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
3. 382 A.2d at 107. The northern boundary of the B-Business zone was the southern
boundary of Surrick's tract. Most of the zone extended eight to ten blocks south from this
point in a section 175 feet wide on either side of Providence Road, the eastern boundary of
Surrick's tract. Id. The gas station south of Surrick's property was, however, the only business
use north of the Media Bypass, a highway running parallel to and about five hundred feet to
the south of Surrick's southern boundary. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 11 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 607, 610, 314 A.2d 565, 566-67 (1974), rev'd, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
In addition to multi-family dwellings, commercial uses were permitted in the B-Business
zone. 382 A.2d at 107 & n.4.
4. Id. at 107.
5. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.
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mit to erect 187 apartment units, but the request was refused by the
township Building Inspector.' Thereafter, Surrick appealed to the
Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Providence Township, 7 which denied his request for a variance' and made findings of fact concerning
the constitutionality of the ordinance
Surrick appealed the decision of the Board to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, 0 which upheld the denial of the
variance and concluded that the zoning ordinance was not unconstitutional." In considering the constitutionality of the ordinance, the
court emphasized that the division of the township into use districts 2 promoted the general welfare, since it contributed to orderly
development of the community. 3 Based upon data pertaining to
6. Brief on Behalf of Intervenors Collectively Known as the Citizens on Zoning at 3,
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
7. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 5. Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code, each municipality that enacts a zoning ordinance pursuant to the Act or prior enabling
codes must have a zoning hearing board consisting of three residents of the municipality,
appointed by the governing body. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10901, 10903 (Purdon 1972). The
functions of the Board include hearing challenges to the validity of zoning ordinances and
requests for variances. Id. §§ 10910, 10912.
8. A variance from the provisions of a zoning ordinance may be granted only if unique
physical conditions peculiar to the property in question, and not caused by the individual
applying for the variance, make it impossible to develop the property as zoned, and thus
inflict an unnecessary hardship on the applicant. The variance must not alter the essential
character of the neighborhood, and must be the minimum modification of the regulations
necessary to give relief. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10912(1)-10912(5) (Purdon 1972).
9. 382 A.2d at 107. At the time of the hearing, the Board was not authorized to determine
constitutional claims, but could only make findings of fact as to these claims. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 10910 (Purdon 1968) (amended 1972). Since then, this section has been amended to
provide that the Board "shall decide all contested questions," in addition to making findings
of fact. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (Purdon 1972).
10. The Code provides that appeals from decisions of the Zoning Hearing Board as to
variance requests and constitutional challenges are to be taken to the court of common pleas
of the county in which the land involved is located. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10102 (Purdon
1972).
11. Appeal of Surrick, 61 Del. Cty. 72 (1973), aff'd, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 607, 314 A.2d 565
(1974), rev'd, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
12. Use districts are legislative divisions of a community in which only certain designated
uses of land, such as residential, industrial, and commercial uses, are permitted. See Best v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 110, 141 A.2d 606, 609 (1958). Such divisions are
authorized by the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. Municipalities may enact
zoning ordinances to accomplish any of the purposes of the Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
10601 (Purdon 1972), which include guiding "uses of land and structures." Id. § 10105. The
Code also provides that zoning ordinances may "permit, prohibit, regulate, restrict and
determine . . . uses of land." Id. § 10603(1).
13. 61 Del. Cty. at 74. A zoning ordinance that restricts the use of property is an unconstitutional taking unless the restriction contributes to the public health, safety, morals or
welfare, and is thus a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. Village of Euclid v.
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apartment construction in the township, the court found that the
ordinance had no de facto exclusionary impact. The common pleas
court believed that a variance should not be granted since the tract
could be reasonably developed as currently zoned and the only resulting hardship to Surrick was essentially "self-inflicted.' 5
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court agreed not only with the
lower court's conclusion that Surrick had failed to prove the hardship required to obtain a zoning variance, 6 but also agreed that the
township's zoning pattern advanced the general welfare of the community. 7 Therefore the court found that the one-acre minimum lot
size in the A-1 Residential district was not unconstitutionally exclusionary, 8 and additionally found that the intent of the requirement
concerning the lot size was not to zone out new residents or to avoid
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). In Euclid, an ordinance dividing a municipality
into use districts was held to be constitutional under this test as against a landowner's claim
that designation of his land as residential was an unconstitutional taking since it deprived
him of the additional value for which the land could be sold for industrial use. Id. at 384-85,
397.
See Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958) (zoning ordinance
setting aside districts for single family residences held valid); Bilbar Construction Co. v.
Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) (ordinance establishing one acre minimum lot size in certain areas found to promote general welfare). See also note 25 and accompanying text infra.
14. Since 1960, 385 apartment units and 697 single-family dwellings had been constructed
in the township, a ratio of one apartment for every 1.5 single family homes. Of the 2,697
residential units in the township at the time of the trial, 565 were rental units. 61 Del. Cty.
at 74-75.
An exclusionary zoning ordinance is one which "render[s] . . . housing costs so prohibitively high that low and moderate-income families cannot afford to buy." Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 453, 468, 300 A.2d 107, 115 (1973), aff'd,
462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). A zoning ordinance can also be exclusionary if it fails to
provide for multi-family dwellings and thus excludes those who can only afford to rent.
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 242, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (1970). An exclusionary zoning ordinance
is unconstitutional. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text infra.
15. 61 Del. Cty. at 77-78. Surrick argued that since the purchase price of the tract in the
agreement of sale was $225,000, and the maximum price at which it would have been profitable to develop the land as zoned was $195,000, the single family residential zoning imposed a
hardship on him. The court quoted Appeal of Gro, 440 Pa. 552, 269 A.2d 876 (1970), for the
proposition that a buyer who agrees to a purchase price which renders it impossible to develop
the land as zoned imposes the hardship upon himself. 61 Del. Cty. at 77-78. A variance may
not be granted to alleviate a self-inflicted hardship. For an explanation of the criteria necessary for a variance grant, see note 8 supra.
16. 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 613-15, 314 A.2d at 568-69.
17. Id. at 616-17, 314 A.2d at 569-70.
18. Id. at 615-17, 314 A.2d at 569-70. The court found that the ordinance was not invalid
on its face, since it did not totally fail to provide for apartments; it also found no de facto
exclusionary impact. Id.
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placing burdens on municipal services. 19
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed 0 the decision of the
commonwealth/ court and ordered that a building permit be issued
to Surrick and zoning approval granted for his land. 2 1 A majority
of the court, speaking through Justice Nix, focused on the question
of whether the Upper Providence Township zoning ordinance was
unconstitutionally exclusionary.2 2 The test used by the supreme
court to determine whether a zoning ordinance offends the Constitutions of the United States = or Pennsylvania 24 was a substantive due
process test: a zoning ordinance is constitutional only if it bears a
substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community.25 Relying upon prior Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cases,26 Justice Nix maintained that the court had in the past
19. Id. at 617, 314 A.2d at 570. For the proposition that exclusionary intent is necessary
for an ordinance to be invalid, the court cited Nat'l Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township
Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965). See note 26 infra.
20. The case was heard before Chief Justice Jones, and Justices Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts,
Nix and Manderino. 382 A.2d at 106. Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the decision,
and Justice Pomeroy did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Justices
Manderino and Roberts concurred in the result, and Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion. Id; at 112, 114-15.
21. 382 A.2d at 112.
22. Id. at 106. Surrick also argued that the court of common pleas denied him due process
when it accepted the findings of fact made by the Zoning Hearing Board concerning facts
which were determinative of his constitutional rights, since the members of the Board, as
residents of Upper Providence, were persons whose private interests were at stake. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 1, at 23-33. This argument, rejected by the commonwealth court, 11
Pa. Commw. Ct. at 609-13, 314 A.2d at 567-68, was not considered in the supreme court
opinion. The court also did not consider whether Surrick was entitled to a variance.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall.., be deprived of. .. property,
without due process of law ....
"
24. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides: "All men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of . . . acquiring,
possessing and protecting property ....
"
25. 382 A.2d at 108 (citing Nat'l Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965)). See note 26 infra.
26. Justice Nix cited Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970),
and Appeal of Girsh. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), as support for this implicit conclusion.
382 A.2d at 108. The majority in Kit-Mar found that the two and three acre minimum lot
sizes in Concord Township's ordinance were not related to police power goals, 439 Pa. at 47071 & 470 n.1, 268 A.2d at 766-67 & 766 n.1, and that these restrictions were invalid as
exclusionary. See id. at 470-78, 268 A.2d at 766-70. The Girsh court held that an ordinance
which made no provision for apartments was both unreasonable and exclusionary. 437 Pa. at
242-45, 263 A.2d at 397-99. Neither court explicitly stated that an exclusionary zoning ordinance cannot bear a substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general
welfare.
Girsh and Kit-Mar each employed much of the reasoning used in Nat'l Land and Inv. Co.
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implicitly concluded that a zoning ordinance which is exclusionary
or unduly restrictive does not bear the requisite substantial relationship to these legitimate police power objectives.Y
The majority also held that municipalities have an obligation to
incorporate the fair share principle when enacting local zoning ordinances.2 The fair share principle, adopted by a plurality of the court
in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.,29 requires
local political units designing land use regulations to plan and provide for the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may
desire to live within the municipality2. In discussing the fair share
principle, Justice Nix noted that it was, adopted to implement concepts found in prior Pennsylvania cases. Among the concepts embraced by that principle are that a municipality, which is a logical
place for population growth, cannot refuse to bear its rightful part
of the burden of growth, and that a municipality must take regional
housing needs into account in land use planning.3' The court did not
v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,215 A.2d 597 (1965). In National Land,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that established a four acre
minimum lot size in 30% of a suburban township's 8.2 square miles, refusing to accept the
public health, safety, and general welfare arguments proffered by the township. Id. at 52531, 215 A.2d at 608-12. NationalLand set forth explicitly the conclusion implicit in Girsh and
Kit-Marconcerning the relationship between exclusionary zoning and the general welfare: "It
is clear . . . that the general welfare is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance
designed to be exclusive and exclusionary." Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612.
27. 382 A.2d at 108.
28. Id.
29. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). In Willistown, the court invalidated a zoning ordinance amendment which set aside for apartments only 80 of the 11,589 acres in the township.
The ordinance was found to be exclusionary because it did not provide a fair share of the
township land for apartments. Id. at 449-50, 341 A.2d at 468.
30. 382 A.2d at 108. The fair share principle was first enunciated in S. Burlington Co.
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), in which the court
found a zoning ordinance of a suburb of Camden invalid. The New Jersey court expressed
the issue in that case as whether a developing municipality could establish a system of land
use regulation which makes it physically and economically impossible to provide low and
moderate income housing within the municipality. Id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. The majority
concluded "[tlhat every such municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively
make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically,
presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity. . . at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefor." Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at
724 (emphasis added).
31. 382 A.2d at 108 (citing Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970)).
The court noted that its ruling in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462
Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975), rested upon the premise established in Girsh that a municipality
must bear its rightful part of the burden, and that this premise incorporated the broader
principle that a municipality cannot plan in isolation.
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perceive the fair share principle to be a new test of constitutionality
in addition to the substantive due process test, but rather as another
method of viewing an ordinance to ascertain whether its provisions
bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals
2
or general welfare.
Justice Nix also recognized that critics of the fair share principle
have expressed concern that its adoption would place courts in the
position of super boards of adjustment, thereby usurping a function
that is more properly legislative or administrative in nature. However, he explicitly denied any intent to involve the courts in such
legislative or administrative functions. He perceived the role of the
courts in fair share cases as being limited to a determination of
whether the zoning ordinance adequately balances and weighs the
factors involved in local and regional housing needs and development. Thus, the actual fashioning of zoning formulas is left to the
33
zoning hearing boards and local governments.
Justice Nix then outlined an analytical method for ascertaining
whether a zoning ordinance is exclusionary. In prior Pennsylvania
cases, the court had considered three factors in making this determination: 34 whether the community was a logical area for development
and population growth, the amount of land available for develop32. The court stated: "The 'fair share' requirement, as we view it, is merely an analytical
strand in the substantial relationship test already employed by this Court in reviewing zoning
ordinances." 382 A.2d at 109 n.8.
33. Id. at 109-10.
34. Id. at 110. In support of the first factor, Justice Nix cited Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), and Nat'l Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See note 26 supra. He also relied upon Waynesborough
Corp. v. Easttown Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 143, 350 A.2d 895,
898 (1976), to demonstrate that a community's proximity to a large metropolis and projected
population growth has been considered relevant to the first factor. In Waynesborough, the
court struck down a zoning ordinance that limited multi-family dwellings to 49 of the 5,250
acres in the township. Id. at 141, 350 A.2d at 897.
Nix also referred to several previous cases that had considered the community's present
level of development, including National Land, Waynesborough, DeCaro v. Washington
Township, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 252, 344 A.2d 725 (1975), and Township of Willistown v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973), aff'd, 462 Pa. 445, 341
A.2d 466 (1975). 382 A.2d at 110. DeCaroinvolved a three acre minimum lot size requirement
in 50% of a rural township. The ordinance was upheld, the court concluding that no minimum
lot size is unconstitutional per se so long as it has a reasonable relationship to the public
health, safety or welfare, and has no exclusionary purpose or effect. 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. at
257-58, 344 A.2d at 728.
The third factor, Justice Nix stated, had previously been considered by Pennsylvania
courts in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), National Land,
and Willistown. 382 A.2d at 110.
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ment in the community, and the exclusionary impact of the ordi5 Justice Nix concluded that
nance .3
where the amount of land zoned
for multi-family dwellings is small in proportion to the demand and
room for potential development, the ordinance is unconstitutionally
36
exclusionary.
Applying this analytical method to Surrick, the court held that
the zoning ordinance of Upper Providence Township was exclusionary. Because it was situated only twelve miles from Philadelphia
and located on major traffic arteries, the township was a logical area
for development and population growth. Moreover, the court noted
that since 25% of the township's land was currently undeveloped,
the present level of development did not preclude further development of multi-family dwellings. In light of these factors, the fortythree acres of township land which apartments had to share with
business uses was disproportionately small.3 7 The majority concluded, therefore, that the township had not provided a fair share
of its land for multi-family dwellings, and consequently the township ordinance was declared unconstitutionally exclusionary. "8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts agreed with the result
reached by the court,3 9 but disagreed with the majority's use of the
concept of fair share. 0 Justice Roberts maintained that a majority
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never adopted fair share,"
and that strong reasons existed for a continued refusal to do so.42
After examining the New Jersey decisions that have applied the
concept of fair share,13 Justice Roberts expressed concern that an
35. 382 A.2d at 110-11. In his discussion of the third factor, Justice Nix focused on
exclusionary impact rather than exclusionary intent, noting that the latter is still considered
if a denial of equal protection is claimed. Id. at 110 & n.10.
36. Id. at 111. While the analytical method was applied here to zoning for multi-family
dwellings, the court relied on cases which dealt with large minimum lot sizes for the factors
considered in the method. See note 34 supra.
The test for an exclusionary ordinance would invalidate not only an ordinance which totally
fails to provide for a certain residential use, but also an ordinance which provides a disproportionately small amount of land for the use, if the other factors are present. See Township
of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975) (court extended
the prohibition against total exclusion to include such partial exclusion See note 29 supra.
37. 382 A.2d at 111-12.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Id.at 114 (Roberts, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Justice Roberts analyzed several cases, including Fobe Ass'n. v. Mayor of Demarest,
74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977) (fair share did not require that any land be zoned for apart-
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attempt to analyze decisions in these terms would transform Pennsylvania courts into super boards of adjustment, a legislative function for which the judiciary is ill-equipped. 4
Surrick represents the first time that a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the concept of fair share and
discussed the court's role in applying this principle." At first glance,
therefore, the standard articulated by the Surrick court appears to
depart from the established Pennsylvania standards for reviewing
the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. In adopting fair share,
however, the court failed to define it in a manner that would impose
upon municipalities any new obligation to fill regional housing
needs. Consequently, Surrick is a mere reiteration of the standards
enunciated in prior Pennsylvania cases, and thus does not alter
Pennsylvania's approach regarding the constitutional analysis of
zoning ordinances. This may be seen by considering the three tests
used by the Surrick court to determine that the Upper Providence
ordinance was unconstitutional.
First, the substantive due process test used in Surrick" has long
been established in Pennsylvania as the test for evaluating the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. 7 Second, since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1965 decision in National Land and Investments in developed municipality); Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, Bergen County,
74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977) (fair share standard held to apply to developing municipalities
only); and Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977) (ordinance zoning 2.37% of a township's ten thousand acres for multi-family dwellings,
and 2% for small lot single family housing, held invalid). Justice Roberts felt that the New
Jersey court in Oakwood became involved in legislative functions and regional zoning. 382
A.2d at 114-15. See notes 73 & 74 and accompanying text infra. He cautioned the Pennsylvania court that New Jersey had limited the applicability of fair share in Fobe and Pascack.
382 A.2d at 115 & n.2.
44. 382 A.2d at 115.
45. A plurality of the court adopted the fair share principle in Township of Willistown v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). In Willistown, however, the court
did not discuss fair share or the role of courts in fashioning relief under the principle. Instead,
the court simply quoted the passage from S. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), in which fair share was first employed, and applied
the principle to the facts of the case without further elaboration. 462 Pa. at 449-50, 341 A.2d
at 468. See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 13 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
47. See, e.g., Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 58, 228 A.2d
169, 178 (1967); Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965); Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397,
405, 207 A.2d 890, 895 (1965); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 111-12, 141
A.2d 606, 610 (1958); Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 72, 141 A.2d
851, 856 (1958).
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ment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,48 a determination that an ordinance is exclusionary is tantamount to a find-

ing that it violates substantive due process. 9 Therefore, Justice
Nix's analytical method for determining whether an ordinance is'
exclusionary likewise did not represent a new test, but rather represented a refinement of the traditional one.
Third, in considering the constitutionality of zoning ordinances,
past Pennsylvania cases have required that municipalities plan with
regional housing needs in mind. The majority in NationalLand was
apprehensive of the consequences that would ensue if every municipality practiced exclusionary zoning, and each political unit considered only its own welfare.50 Thereafter, in Appeal of Girsh,5 ' the
court spoke of the obligation of developing municipalities to assume
part of the burden of providing municipal services," and to not use
exclusionary zoning to avoid this responsibility by unnaturally limiting population.5 3 Moreover, in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,5" the
supreme court maintained that a municipality which practiced exclusionary zoning and failed to consider regional housing needs had
determined wrongfully the fate of neighboring communities. Although these cases did not employ the term "fair share," they did
express a commitment by the court to require local governments to
look beyond their own borders in land-use planning.
In light of these earlier cases, an analysis of the fair share standard set forth in Surrick discloses that it adds nothing to the existing obligation of municipalities to provide for regional housing
needs. Justice Nix viewed the fair share requirement as an
"analytical strand" in the substantive due process test, rather than
48. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
49. See note 26 supra.
50. The court in National Land observed: "It is not difficult to envision the tremendous
hardship, as well as the chaotic conditions, which would result if all the townships in this
area decided to deny to a growing population sites for residential development within the
means of at least a significant segment of the people." 419 Pa. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
51. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
52. "Municipal services must be provided somewhere, and if Nether Providence is a
logical place for development to take place, it should not be heard to say that it will not bear
its rightful part of the burden." Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
53. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
54. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). The Kit-Mar court stated:
If Concord Township is successful in unnaturally limiting its population growth
through the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would normally live
there will inevitably have to live in another community, and the requirement that they
do so is not a decision that Concord Township should alone be able to make.
Id. at 474-75, 268 A.2d at 769.
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as a new test of constitutionalityss Furthermore, the Surrick court
essentially merged the test for determining compliance with the fair
share standard with the test for determining whether an ordinance
is unconstitutionally exclusionary. The factors which affect local
and regional housing needs, factors that Justice Nix enunciated in
his analytical method for determining whether an ordinance was
exclusionary, were the same factors that he previously used in ascertaining whether a municipality had provided its fair share of housing. 56 Accordingly, after considering these factors and concluding
that the Upper Providence ordinance was exclusionary, and without
considering separately whether it violated the fair share standard,
the court held that the township had not provided a fair share of
its land for apartments. 7
The Surrick court's approach to fair share is very different from
that of New Jersey, the jurisdiction in which the principle was first
enunciated.58 An examination of several important New Jersey decisions in this area reveals that, unlike Pennsylvania, New Jersey
views the fair share standard as an affirmative obligation, extending
beyond the requirement that a zoning ordinance not be exclusionary. In South Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel,59 the New Jersey decision first defining fair share, the term
was used as a quantitative standard that delineated the extent to
which municipalities must provide for local and regional housing
needs. 9 The Mount Laurel court indicated that a figure represent55. 382 A.2d at 109 n.8, See note 32 supra.
56. The court used nearly identical language in setting forth the fair share standard and
in discussing the test for an exclusionary ordinance. The fair share principle was limited as
follows:
In establishing the "fair share" standard, this Court has merely stated the general
precept which zoning hearing boards and governing bodies must satisfy by the full
utilization of their respective administrative and legislative expertise. We intend our
scope of review to be limited to determining whether the zoning formulas fashioned
by these entities reflect a balanced and weighted consideration of the many factors
which bear upon local and regional housing needs and development.
382 A.2d at 109-10. After setting forth the analytical method for determining whether a zoning
ordinance is exclusionary, the court acknowledged that factors other than those listed could
be considered, and stated: "We anticipate that zoning boards and governing bodies, in the
exercise of their special expertise in zoning matters, will develop and consider any number
of factors relevant to the need for and distribution of local and regional housing." Id. at 111
n.12.
57. Id. at 111-12.
58. See note 30 supra.
59. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
60. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. See note 30 supra.
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ing the township's fair share of low and moderate income housing
could be determined by local and state planning agencies." Although the New Jersey Supreme Court in Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison 2 did not require the municipality to devise
a formula representing its fair share in terms of housing units, the
majority in that case did perceive the fair share principle to be one
requiring affirmative action of municipalities. Under the Oakwood
rationale, zoning ordinances were to be designed to provide for a fair
share of the lower income housing needs of the region. 4 To comply
with the fair share standard articulated in these cases, municipalities must actively determine and plan for regional needs, and not
merely passively refrain from engaging in exclusionary conduct.
The difference between the New Jersey and Pennsylvania definitions of fair share may be attributable to the fact that the issue arose
in different factual settings in the two jurisdictions. In Surrick, the
plaintiff was a landowner 5 who successfully claimed that the ordinance deprived him of his property without due process of law, since
it restricted his use of the land for a reason not substantially related
to a police power objective."6 The court granted Surrick a building
permit and zoning approval to permit apartments, 7 a remedy which
provided for the desired use of his land. The court did not order any
other change in the township's zoning scheme, nor did it claim that
this decree would result in achievement of the desired fair share. s
61. 67 N.J. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733.
62. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). The zoning ordinance amendment invalidated in
Oakwood zoned only 2.37% of the township's approximately ten thousand undeveloped acres
for multi-family dwellings. Only 2% was zoned for single family homes on lots smaller than
ten thousand square feet. The zoning ordinance also allowed apartments in planned unit
development areas, and small lot single family or attached houses in cluster development
areas. Other requirements for such developments, however, increased the cost to such an
extent that it was not economically feasible to build for low income families. Id.
63. Id. at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200.
64. Id. at 525, 371 A.2d at 1213.
65. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
66. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 9-16. See notes 13 & 25 and accompanying text
supra.
67. 382 A.2d at 112.
68. Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, this was the only remedy the
court could provide in a challenge to a zoning ordinance. The Code provides that, in a zoning
appeal, the court shall have the power to declare an ordinance invalid and to set aside or
modify any action of a municipal governing body, agency, or officer brought on appeal. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (Purdon 1972). The first section of the Appeals Article of the Code
states that the proceedings set forth in the Article shall constitute the exclusive mode for
securing review of a zoning ordinance. Id. § 11001.
Pennsylvania cases have also held that, where a statutory remedy is provided, it is exclu.
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Thus, the relief granted in Surrick was no more extensive in scope
than the relief afforded in prior cases to plaintiffs who had proved
only that a zoning ordinance was exclusionary without relying upon
a fair share argument. 6
On the other hand, the plaintiffs in each of the New Jersey fair
share decisions included poor persons excluded from a municipality
because of its restrictive zoning patterns. 0 In each instance, the
municipality had zoned in a fashion that deliberately maintained
the cost of housing at a price that low and middle income persons
sive, and a court cannot order another remedy. See, e.g., Wilkinsburg-Penn Joint Water
Authority v. Borough of Churchill, 417 Pa. 93, 207 A.2d 905 (1965); Gold v. Dep't of Public
Instruction, Commonwealth of Pa. Pub. School Employees Retirement Bd., 16 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 247, 328 A.2d 559 (1974). In Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975),
the court concluded that a court considering a challenge to a zoning ordinance under the Code
could not order a municipality to amend the ordinance, since amendment is a purely legislative matter, exclusively within the control of the municipal governing body. Id. at 520-21, 338
A.2d at 751.
69. See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 469, 478, 268 A.2d 765, 766, 770
(1970) (township ordered to rezone plaintiff's land to permit homes on one acre lots, and to
grant building permit); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 240, 263 A.2d 395, 396 (1970) (failure
to provide for apartments held unconstitutional); Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 510, 533, 215 A.2d 597, 601, 613 (1965) (ordinance
declared unconstitutional, and lower court order remanding case to board of adjustment
upheld).
In Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975), in
which the court did utilize the fair share standard, it directed that zoning approval and a
building permit be granted to the plaintiff. Id. at 450, 341 A.2d at 468.
See Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, 6 RuT.CAM. L.J. 689 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose], in which the author compared Kit-Mar,
Girsh and National Land with S. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), and noted that although the Pennsylvania cases prohibit
exclusionary zoning, they "support ... only indirectly" the proposition of Mount Laurel that
municipalities must provide for their fair share. Rose observed that these Pennsylvania cases
"did not expressly state that the validity of the ordinances would depend upon whether they
contained affirmative programs to meet regional housing needs." Id. at 702.
70. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 492, 371 A.2d 1192,
1196-97 (1977); S. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 159 &
n.3, 172-73, 336 A.2d 713, 717 & n.3, 724 (1975).
In Pennsylvania, such plaintiffs could not challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance. The
Municipalities Planning Code limits the right to appeal to landowners wishing to challenge
the validity of a zoning provision that prohibits or restricts the use or development of land in
which they have an interest, or persons aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the
land of another. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11004-11007 (Purdon 1972). The Code provisions
constitute the exclusive mode for securing review of a zoning ordinance. See note 68 supra.
For a discussion of the advantages to and problems of using an equal protection approach,
rather than a substantive due process approach in exclusionary zoning cases involving such
plaintiffs, see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
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could not afford."' The remedies provided by the New Jersey court
were designed to effectuate the ultimate goal of enabling such persons to live in the municipality. In Mount Laurel, the township was
ordered to eliminate the deficiencies in its zoning ordinance.72 The
Oakwood court specified the minimum revisions to be made in the
ordinance 3 to ensure that it would provide for a fair and reasonable
share of the "least cost" housing needs of Madison's region.7' The
New Jersey court corrected the unconstitutional ordinances by
mandating alterations of their contents; rather than merely permitting the plaintiff to use his land in a certain desired manner, the
decisions sought to bring future zoning patterns of the municipalities into compliance with the fair share standard.75
71. See note 14 supra.
72. The plaintiffs in Mount Laurel were permitted to attack any such revised ordinance
by supplemental complaint. 67 N.J. at 191, 336 A.2d at 734.
73. The changes mandated by the court were as follows:
The revision shall, as minima: (a) allocate substantial areas for single-family dwellings on very small lots; (b) substantially enlarge the areas for dwellings on moderate
sized lots; (c) substantially enlarge the AF district [multi-family apartment zone] or
create other enlarged multi-family zones; (d) reduce the RP [Recreational Preservation], R-80 [two acre minimum lot size] and R-40 [one acre minimum lot size] zones
to the extent necessary to effect the foregoing...; (e) modify the restrictions in the
AF zones and PUD [planned unit development] areas . . . which discourage the
construction of apartments of more than two bedrooms; (f) modify the PUD regulations to eliminate . . . undue cost-generating requirements . . .; and (g) generally
eliminate and reduce undue cost-generating restrictions in the zones allocated to the
achievement of lower income housing in accordance with the principles of least cost
zoning ....
72 N.J. at 553, 371 A.2d at 1228. The revised ordinance was to be submitted to the trial court
for its approval. Id.
74. Id. "Least cost housing" was defined as housing constructed at the least cost consistent with reasonable standards of health, safety and welfare. Id. at 513 n.21, 371 A.2d at 1208
n.21. The court in Oakwood realized that it would not always be possible for a municipality
to guarantee construction of low income housing, due to the reluctance of developer to build
such housing without government subsidies or legislated incentives. In such instances, zoning
for least cost housing was adopted as the goal. Id. at 510-12, 371 A.2d at 1206-07. The court
felt that construction of least cost housing would increase the total housing supply and
provide housing for low income families through a "filtering" process, as moderate income
families would move into this housing, leaving their older, less expensive housing vacant for
low income families. Id. at 513-14, 371 A.2d at 1207-08.
75. The majority in Surrick did state that the principle of fair share requires local political
units to plan for the needs of all categories of people who may wish to live in them. See notes
28-30 and accompanying text supra. The remedy in Surrick, however, did not affect the
municipality's zoning plan, except for the rezoning of the plaintiff's land. See notes 67 & 68
and accompanying text supra.
Translating such decrees into actual low and moderate income housing often engenders
problems because of factors other than zoning which impede development of low and moderate income housing. For a discussion of the problems involved, see Mallach, Do Lawsuits
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The New Jersey decisions also illustrate that the adoption of the
fair share standard does not necessarily involve courts in fashioning
zoning formulas, a function that is essentially legislative in nature.7
The New Jersey courts did not set aside certain land areas within
the municipality for low income housing, nor did they mandate a
specific number of units of such housing." Rather, they left these
zoning functions to the local legislature, to be exercised within the
limits of the judicial standard. The remedies in these cases are
comparable to those in housing and school desegregation cases, in
which the Supreme Court has ordered governmental units to submit
plans of affirmative action to correct imbalances.7
In light of the fact that Pennsylvania does not require any such
affirmative action on the part of municipalities to comply with fair
share, it is difficult to perceive of any necessity for adopting the
principle, at least in a factual situation similar to that presented in
Surrick. The prior Pennsylvania test for compliance with due process -

that an ordinance not be exclusionary in nature - resulted

in the same minimal alleviation of the housing needs of low and
moderate income persons as the Surrick fair share requirment 75 The
new standard, which is in effect a prohibition against exclusionary
zoning, will most likely engender confusion, not only for municipal
governments in fashioning zoning ordinances, but also for courts
who must consider their validity.
Sally A. Davoren
Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 653
(1975). Mallach concludes that judicial remedies are nonetheless valuable, since they create
"a climate for legislative land use reform." Id. at 686.
76. Critics of fair share have claimed that adoption of the standard has this effect. See,
e.g., 382 A.2d at 115 (Roberts, J., concurring).
77. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra.
78. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.; 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (if desegregation plan submitted by school district is unsatisfactory, court can formulate its own plan);
Reynold, Judge v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (court may order state legislature to reapportion
voting districts which violate equal protection clause, and may grant judicial relief if legislatures fail to obey order); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (defendant school boards
ordered to devise plan to desegregate school systems under supervision of federal district
court).
See also Rose, supra note 69, at 723-24, in which the author maintains that school desegregation cases, public housing dispersal cases, and the New Jersey exclusionary zoning cases
afford ample precedent for deciding that an exclusionary ordinance is invalid and for providing a remedy which alters the circumstances upon which the determination of illegality is
based.
79. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.

